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HOW REASONABLE IS “REASONABLE”?
THE SEARCH FOR A SATISFACTORY
APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOKS
BRYCE YODER†
ABSTRACT
Although courts, in considering the enforceability of employment
handbooks, have relied on a single source of principles, contract law,
their inconsistent approaches have produced inequitable and
irreconcilable results. This Note argues that courts should abandon
their dependence on contract law when analyzing handbook claims
and instead adopt an employment-based approach that balances the
needs of employers with the realistic expectations of employees.
Accordingly, this Note proposes three rules for analyzing the
legitimacy of handbook modifications: (1) employers should always
be permitted to unilaterally modify handbooks; (2) employers must
provide employees reasonable notice, defined as a length of time set
by the type and importance of the promise made in a handbook,
before modifying a handbook; and (3) handbook disclaimers should
be ignored, as they often have inequitable results for employees and
employers alike.

INTRODUCTION
Employment at will is the default rule in American employment,1
permitting either the employer or employee to terminate their
relationship at any time for “good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
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all.” Yet courts have increasingly chipped away at the presumption of
at-will employment, in particular due to its often harsh and unfair
impact upon employees.3 A notable example of this trend is the socalled “handbook exception” to the at-will doctrine, under which
employers who issue handbooks to their employees may create
enforceable, implied contracts that negate the presumption of at-will
4
employment. Quite commonly, employers provide their workforce
such manuals—detailing the policies and procedures of the company,
which may include everything from dismissal procedures to
compensation rates—but no written contract. In the absence of an
express agreement, employees are sometimes left without a remedy
when a dispute over the work relationship arises. In such situations,
the handbook is often the primary, or only, source of contractual
terms.5 Recognizing the possibility that handbooks can impose
binding obligations upon the employer—for implicit or explicit
promises made in the handbook—thus helps ensure a degree of
fundamental fairness in the relationship between employer and
employees.6
But the evolution of handbook jurisprudence has generated
much disagreement. Not only do courts differ widely in the effect they
2. Bellum v. PCE Constructors, Inc., 407 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Payne v.
W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“All [employers] may dismiss their employees
at will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong.”).
3. See, e.g., Fulford v. Burndy Corp., 623 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D.N.H. 1985) (holding that “a
termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith
or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public
good”); Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (holding that “when an
employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right an exception” to the atwill employment rule operates); see also Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of
Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachment on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 197, 201–02 (1990) (describing challenges to the rationale for the at-will
employment rule).
4. Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 375, 378–
79 (2002). Other prominent exceptions to at-will employment include tort claims based on
public policy and an implied duty of good faith. Id. at 378.
5. See, e.g., Brown v. Sabre, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 581, 588–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that an employee to whom promises of vacation time had only been made in a manual with a
disclaimer was not entitled to relief as there had been no breach of contract).
6. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985), modified,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (“All that . . . [is] require[d] of an employer is that it be fair. It would
be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe
that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on those
promises.”).
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grant employment handbooks—some still do not recognize them as
7
legally binding upon the employer at all —they vary greatly in the
legal framework within which they analyze the issue.8 For example,
many courts rely exclusively on what they regard as traditional
9
contract law, whereas others base their results on public policy. The
result is a hodgepodge of various results and analytical methods:
often courts achieve the “right” result for doctrinally questionable
reasons,10 even though others achieve decidedly unfair or impractical
results for technically correct reasons.11
To comprehend the enormity of the confusion for courts,
employers, and employees, consider the following example: “Tim” is
an at-will employee with no written contract. He received a handbook
in his first week on the job, in which all employees were guaranteed a
minimum of three weeks of paid vacation per year, albeit by means of
a fairly elaborate compensation scheme tied to seniority rights. This
system had long been company policy and was one of the main
reasons Tim took the job. The handbook, however, contained a
disclaimer near its end, stating that nothing in the handbook
regarding compensation should be considered an offer. Six months
later, Tim’s employer provides a modified handbook stating that
employees will no longer receive any paid vacation, although vacation
time presently accrued may still be used. After Tim’s employer does

7. See Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that the “unilateral act of publishing its handbook was not a contractual offer to its
employees”).
8. Most courts claim to apply traditional contracts principles; however, their specific
applications of contract law and the attendant results are not uniform. For a full discussion, see
infra Part I.B.2.
9. W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict
with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 11 (2003).
10. Some courts permit unilateral modification of handbooks by an employer, but only if
reasonable notice is provided to the employee, although requiring such notice conflicts with
fundamental contracts principles. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73–74, 81 (Cal. 2000)
(finding that two years after a unilateral modification was sufficient reasonable notice). For
further discussion of the problems posed by this approach to unilateral modification of
handbooks, see the discussion infra Part I.B.3.b.
11. Courts strictly applying traditional contract principles often allow employers to
unilaterally modify handbooks which had previously created contractual agreements, sometimes
without even providing reasonable notice. See, e.g., Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d
428, 429, 431 (Va. 1992) (holding that although an employee had originally received a handbook
containing a just cause promise, he reverted to being an at-will employee when he signed a form
stating he was at will and he gave consideration by continuing to work for the employer).
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not pay him for his next vacation, he sues for the amount he would
have received under the terms of the original handbook.
Courts approach problems such as this in one of several different
ways. First, absent a clear intention from the employer to form a
contractual relationship, the handbook could never have created an
12
offer in the first place, and so Tim has no recourse. Second, the
handbook could have potentially created an offer, but the disclaimer
effectively prevented it from doing so, and Tim has no recourse.13
Third, the disclaimer could be ignored—because of ambiguities in the
disclaimer such as whether paid vacation is really compensationrelated and because of the long-standing practice of the employer—
and the employer must provide Tim with additional consideration to
change the handbook.14 Thus, Tim is entitled to three weeks’ paid
vacation for as long as he works there. Fourth, the handbook did
create a valid offer, but the employer may modify it at any time
without additional consideration, and Tim has no recourse.15 Fifth, the
handbook did create a valid offer and the employer could modify by
providing “reasonable notice”; Tim has recourse only if the
notification was not reasonable.16
Although the potential outcomes in this example are mostly
uniform—Tim would most likely lose in four of the five instances—
the analyses behind the results vary significantly. As a result, slight
changes to the fact pattern could have enormous consequences. For
example, if the original handbook had no disclaimer but the
subsequently modified handbook did, some courts would grant Tim a
contractual right in that first handbook’s terms and require the
12. See, e.g., Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that a reasonable employee would not
interpret general language and a disclaimer in an employment handbook as an offer to modify
an at-will employment agreement).
13. See, e.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287–89 (Iowa 1995)
(holding that an “explicit disclaimer[]” in an employee manual barred the formation of a valid
offer to modify at-will employment status).
14. See, e.g., Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708–09, 13 (Vt. 2002) (holding
that a disclaimer that preceded a description of the employer’s termination policies was too
ambiguous to create a clear at-will employment agreement).
15. See, e.g., Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
(characterizing an employee handbook as “a unilateral contract . . . in which the promisor does
not receive a promise in return as consideration”).
16. See, e.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. 2000) (“The general rule governing
the proper termination of unilateral contracts [created by employee handbooks] is that once the
promisor determines after a reasonable time that it will terminate or modify the contract, and
provides employees with reasonable notice of the change, additional consideration is not
required.”).
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17
employer to provide consideration to modify. On the same facts,
other courts would hold that unless a handbook represents a clear
contractual offer, it cannot create binding obligations upon the
18
employer, and so Tim has no remedy. Consequently, the underlying
method with which a court approaches handbook jurisprudence
makes a phenomenal difference, and courts are far from finding any
uniform methodology.
The differing, and often contradictory, ways in which courts
confront handbooks arise from a pervasive and fundamental
mischaracterization of the employment relationship: the connection
between employer and employee has wrongly been treated as one of
19
contract rather than status. Even when they entirely disagree on the
outcome in handbook cases, nearly all courts analyze the situation as
a contractual dispute.20 But by rigorously applying contract law to
employment cases when the fit is at best awkward and at worst
misguided, the result is an unhappy marriage in which the
employment relationship is harmed by inequitable results while
21
contract law is warped into an undesirable shape. Consequently, a
strict contract-based analysis of the validity and interpretation of
employment handbooks should be abandoned in favor of a commonsense approach that acknowledges the employment relationship as
one of status.
In response to the dilemma, which is perpetuated by a
mischaracterization of employment as a contractual relationship, this
Note proposes three foundational rules for analyzing handbooks:

1. Employers should always be allowed to modify their
handbooks upon reasonable notice without any further
burden, such as providing “additional consideration.”

17. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that “an
implied-in-fact employment term must be governed by . . . traditional contract law” including
offer, acceptance, and consideration).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc) (opining that “[a]n employer’s offer must be stated with greater definiteness and clarity”
than in the employee handbook at issue).
19. For a thorough discussion of employment as a status rather than contractual
relationship, see Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the
Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 42–47 (2003).
20. Walters, supra note 4, at 379. Several jurisdictions rely on public policy to find
handbook promises binding. Id.
21. Snyder, supra note 19, at 35–36.
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2. The length of advance notice required for modification to
be “reasonable” should depend upon the nature of the
promise being amended.
3. Disclaimers should be irrelevant in determining whether a
handbook, or its subsequent modification, is enforceable.
Part I of this Note outlines the doctrinal confusion courts have
created by treating the employment relationship as one of contract
rather than status. Part II further explains the three proposed rules.
Finally, Part III illuminates these rules by providing several examples
of how they would alleviate doctrinal confusion and thus aid both
employers and employees.
I. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO HANDBOOK ANALYSIS
A. Inconsistent Approaches by Courts Using Contract Law
Although many courts have considered the topic, handbook
jurisprudence has developed only since the 1970s22 and results are far
from consistent. As a threshold matter, courts do not agree on the
basic point of whether manuals can ever provide an exception to the
at-will arrangement.23 The range spans from courts essentially holding
that it is never possible to create contractual obligations through a
24
manual, to those holding that manuals can give rise even to property
interests.25 Nevertheless, almost all courts find that handbooks can—
under various circumstances—create contractual obligations upon the
26
employer that obviate the at-will default. These courts, however,
continue to disagree over the legal analysis that should govern
handbook cases.

22. Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally
Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 810 n.66 (2003).
23. Compare Johnson v. Nat’l Beef Packing Co., 551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan. 1976) (“[A
handbook is] only a unilateral expression of company policy and procedures. Its terms were not
bargained for by the parties and any benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no
meeting of the minds was evidenced by the [employer’s] unilateral act of publishing company
policy.”), with Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1265–66 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (finding a handbook enforceable in accordance with the
reasonable expectations it gave the employees).
24. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 661–62 (finding that a handbook was “merely an informational
statement of . . . self-imposed policies”).
25. Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916, 919 (4th Cir. 1975).
26. Walters, supra note 4, at 379.
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The vast majority of courts finding that handbooks can create
binding obligations on an employer do so under a theory of unilateral
27
contracts. The basic analysis is this: by issuing an employment
manual, the employer creates an offer that the employee accepts and
28
provides consideration for by continuing to work. But recognizing
that handbooks can give rise to contractual obligations presents an
even more challenging problem: specifically, in what manner may
employers, having thus created additional employee rights, later limit
or rescind those rights by amending or replacing the handbook?
Despite claiming to apply the same jurisprudential approach
(unilateral contracts), courts have reached fundamentally opposite
results that generally fall into one of two schools: those that require
additional consideration from the employer before the manual may
be modified and those that do not.29 Although courts on both sides
claim that their approach is ultimately rooted in contract law,30 the
two approaches produce very different results.
Both approaches are appealing for various reasons but in some
31
instances result in gross inequity or impracticality. Permitting
employers to unilaterally modify their handbooks allows them to
discard important promises, such as job security, with little or no
notice to their employees.32 In contrast, employers who must provide
additional consideration before they can modify a handbook may be
saddled in perpetuity with outmoded policies that they cannot
effectively change, perhaps because some employees hold out or the
cost to placate all employees is too high.33

27. Id. at 382. A handbook exception has also been recognized for public policy reasons in
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980).
28. Slawson, supra note 9, at 21. Some courts, in contrast, use a bilateral contracts analysis,
requiring that employers receive the employee’s consent to modify; this approach is incorrect,
however, as an employer who issues a handbook does not exchange promises (the hallmark of a
bilateral exchange) with the employee, but rather awaits the employee’s return promise, i.e.,
continuing to work. See Walters, supra note 4, at 384–85 (discussing various approaches by
courts to modifications of employment contracts).
29. Walters, supra note 4, at 375–76.
30. Kohn, supra note 22, at 840 (“Neither the courts in favor of or against unilateral
modification of implied employment contracts provide any justification firmly rooted in contract
law for their positions. Nevertheless, a majority of the courts on both sides of the issue claim
their decisions are grounded in traditional principles of contract law.”) (footnotes omitted).
31. See discussion infra Part I.B.
32. See, e.g., Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 813–17 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). For a
complete discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1142–45 (Ill. 1999). In that case,
several nurses terminated in 1991 sued a hospital to enforce termination procedures originally

06__YODER.DOC

1524

5/27/2008 1:57:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1517

The result is great confusion among employers and employees,
who have no firm sense of what rights may or may not exist due to
company manuals, and among the courts, which have no uniform
answer to give. These disparate and unsatisfactory outcomes result
from the doctrinally incorrect and normatively troubling application
of contract law in the employment context. Specifically, the confusion
that characterizes handbook jurisprudence emanates from courts who
overzealously apply contract principles—such as “consideration,”
“meeting of the minds,” and “offer and acceptance”—when
determining the legal weight of an employment manual.
B. The Undesirable Application of Contract Law in the Employment
Context
Employment law and contract law are in many ways strange
bedfellows. Although a basic tenet of modern employment law is that
34
the employment relationship is at heart a contractual one,
35
employment was not historically regarded as such, and contract law
was not regarded as the proper tool for upholding the employment
relationship. Problems that arise in the context of employment law
often stem from the misguided application of contracts to the
36
Changing how courts fundamentally view the
workplace.
employment relationship would be a positive step in achieving
doctrinally consistent and just results. Perhaps they have just seen
employment and contract lying side-by-side for so long that they have
grown accustomed to the oddity.
Applying contract law to employment cases in general is
undesirable for four reasons: (1) it is inconsistent with the historical
separation of contract and employment law; (2) it is theoretically
misguided as contract and employment law attempt to accomplish far

disseminated in a handbook issued in 1971. Id. at 1142–43. The court found that subsequent
modifications to the handbook changing those policies were unenforceable because they lacked
additional consideration, and so the hospital was obliged to follow the original terms. Id. at
1145. For companies as large as a hospital, it may be practically impossible to ever modify
handbooks because recognizing each employee’s date of hiring and acceptance of the
handbook’s new terms will be necessary for the employer to enforce the modification.
34. Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment
Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
35. See Snyder, supra note 19, at 36–39 (explaining the historical origins of employment
law).
36. See id. at 35 (detailing how “contract law frequently does a poor job of dealing with
employment law issues”).
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different goals; (3) it is normatively inappropriate to unite the two, as
evidenced by the undesirable outcomes seen by various courts’
treatments of handbook cases; and (4) it encourages courts to employ
handbook disclaimers dispositively, often in a particularly unfair
manner.
1. Historical Separation of Contract and Employment Law.
Contract law and employment relationships grew from distinct and
separate geneses. Contracts originated to protect commercial actors
(buyers and sellers) in voluntary transactions for the purpose of
encouraging and making more efficient commercial exchanges.37 On
the other hand, employment law emerged from the necessity of
38
regulating the relationship between master and servant. Thus, the
employment relationship was, at its origin, one of status and not
contract.39 This status-based approach to the work relationship—in
which the servant labored for the master, who in turn looked out for
40
the servant’s health and well-being —was gradually subsumed by the
view that employment was in fact a contractual arrangement,41 one
that was best served by an absolute freedom for both parties to do as
they pleased. The transition was consummated by the widespread
adoption of the at-will rule in the mid-nineteenth century.42 Yet
although the at-will rule fostered the growth of American industry in
43
its infancy, a major lingering effect has been the harm of workers
coping with a labor market that no longer exists in the paradigm of
44
full-time, long-term, and stable employment. Accordingly, courts

37. Id. at 39.
38. Id. at 36–39.
39. Id. at 36. In analyzing the nature of the employment relationship, Professor Snyder is
making a descriptive and not a normative argument: “I am not arguing that [employment]
should be a status relationship, merely that it has been one since time immemorial and
continues to be treated so today, regardless of the legal theories applied.” Id. at 34.
40. Pratt, supra note 3, at 198.
41. Snyder, supra note 19, at 43–44.
42. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 9.
43. Pratt, supra note 3, at 200.
44. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 51. Increasingly, employers have dismantled the
traditional market model (viewing employment as lifelong or long-term) in favor of one
regarding employment as short-term, in which highly mobile and autonomous workers change
jobs fairly often (the median job tenure is only four years for workers at least sixteen years old).
Id. at 67. Consequently, workers are more susceptible to downsizing, lay-offs, and other
corporate realignments. Id. Additionally, the workplace has witnessed the decline of the
seniority principle, which determines entitlement to fringe benefits by the worker’s seniority.
Such systems have traditionally protected workers with the most invested in the company—and
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have more frequently found exceptions to and ways around the unjust
consequences of the at-will rule.
2. Theoretical Difficulties in Applying Traditional Contract
Principles to Employment. Although the merging of employment law
with contract law may have proved beneficial to industry, it was by no
means a perfect, or even appropriate, match. Using contracts to deal
with employment issues often makes for a poor fit—as one
commentator has summed it up, in applying contract law to the
employment relationship, “We are trying . . . to fill a round hole with
a square peg.”45 On a fundamental level, employment law and
contract law attempt to accomplish different goals, and forcefully
merging the two can produce muddled and unjust results while having
deleterious effects on both. Unsurprisingly, courts and commentators
therefore struggle to apply traditional contract law to handbook
cases.
The most glaring disagreement is over how employers, having
issued a handbook, may subsequently modify or rescind any promises
contained therein. Those courts that conclude handbooks create
binding contractual promises on the employer that cannot be
modified without providing additional consideration to the employee
46
base their analysis primarily on the notions of offer and acceptance.
They argue that although an employer can regard silence as
acceptance of the initial issuance of a handbook—because rights are
only being created—an employee’s continuing to work after the
modified handbook was issued does not constitute acceptance of the
offer contained in the amended handbook, and the modification is
not binding.47 Instead, the employee must “necessarily demonstrate[]
his consent to the proposed modification of the preexisting

presumably with the lowest mobility—from unfair or harsh treatment. Id. at 72. Its collapse
leaves workers, especially long-term workers, in a much more vulnerable position. Id.
45. Snyder, supra note 19, at 36.
46. See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995)
(holding that an employee does not accept the terms offered in a modified handbook merely by
continuing to work); Pratt, supra note 3, at 221 (discussion the analytical steps under this
method).
47. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kings Entm’t Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1987) (“As
with all offers, an offer embodied in an employee policy handbook may be accepted or rejected
by the offeree-employee. . . . Requiring an offeree to take affirmative steps to reject an offer,
however, is inconsistent with general contract law.”). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1979) (discussing the inability of an offeror “to cause the silence of the
offeree to operate as acceptance”).
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48
contract.” The underlying premise behind this position is that in its
absence employees would simply have no way to enforce the rights
they gained from the manual in the first place.49 Yet a majority of
courts permit unilateral modification of handbooks by an employer;
these courts find that the employer’s modification represents an offer
that the employee accepts by continuing to work.50 The practical
difference in these approaches is that a requirement of additional
consideration presumptively favors the employee challenging the new
handbook, whereas unilateral modification strongly favors employers
wanting to enforce the changed terms. Nevertheless, both sides claim
that traditional contract principles favor their position.51
This general confusion stems from a basic, theoretical error made
by the courts: employment and contract law serve different doctrinal
purposes, and so applying contract law in employment situations is
fundamentally inappropriate. Although the employment relationship
resembles a contract in that two independent actors are in essence
52
agreeing to exchange labor for compensation, this simple paradigm
is far from representing the many nuances of the employment
53
relationship. For instance, many at-will employees do not have a
written contract; rather, they make an oral or implied agreement to
54
work for their employer. Typically, employment agreements are
deliberately left incomplete to provide each party with the flexibility
it desires in approaching the work relationship, and, more so than
other contractual bargains, the employment relationship depends
upon implied terms.55 Because of this extraordinarily open-ended
arrangement, it appears that the “agreement” between employer and
employee is not a contract at all but rather a mutual decision to enter
into a master-servant arrangement in which both parties implicitly

48. Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 98.
49. See, e.g., id. at 99 (noting that if additional consideration is not required when
employees are presented with a new manual, “[t]he employee’s only choices would be to resign
or to continue working, either of which would result in the loss of the very right at issue”).
50. Slawson, supra note 9, at 11.
51. Kohn, supra note 22, at 840.
52. Snyder, supra note 19, at 33.
53. Arnow-Richman, supra note 34, at 1.
54. Clyde Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 503,
504 (1997); Donna Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separators, and Employment At-Will, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351, 357 (2001).
55. Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Contracts: A
“Comparative Conversation” Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883,
887–88 (2006).
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recognize the flexibility needed by the other but rely upon the other
56
to act appropriately for their mutual benefit. Accordingly,
employment law, more so than contract law, attempts to do what is
right by the parties rather than strictly enforce the terms of the
bargain.57
In contrast to the goal of regulating and protecting the parties
engaged in a status relationship, contract law is premised on enforcing
the agreements of parties without regard to their particular status or
58
circumstances. Although generally employment law wants to protect
and accommodate a reasonable working arrangement among the
parties,59 contract law is willing to uphold the fringe or idiosyncratic
60
preferences of individual actors. Even though the two areas of law
overlap to a great degree, they do have underlying differences in
goals and justification, which make their application in the other’s
field oftentimes uncomfortable. Ultimately, continually applying
contract law to employment situations harms the doctrines and
principles behind both sets of law.
Contract law is often bent into bizarre shapes when forced to
tend to employment issues; for example, the sticky concept of
promissory restitution evolved from an attempt to “do the right
thing” in an employment case when no valid contractual remedy
existed.61 In Webb v. McGowin,62 an employee saved his employer

56. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 34, at 2 (“Employees anticipate that their work
obligations will develop and change over time, and they know they must oblige instructions and
assignments that may exceed the bounds of any static job description. In return, they expect
employers to abide by the letter and spirit of their official and unofficial promises, exercising
managerial discretion equitably and making exceptions to the company policy where
appropriate.” (footnote omitted)).
57. See Snyder, supra note 19, at 48 (“Our status notions with respect to employment are so
strong that they tend to give us a powerful message as to what the ‘right’ result ought to be in a
given case, regardless of the specific agreement of the parties.”).
58. Id. at 41.
59. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 216 (“Concerns of fairness and an increasing willingness to
examine the employment relationship with approaches ‘more adopted [sic] to the realities of the
workplace’ . . . . is part of a . . . . continuing erosion of the American Rule that increasingly takes
into account the rights of employees and the public.” (footnotes omitted) (italics added)).
60. See RLS Assocs. v. United Bank of Kuwait, 380 F.3d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting
that so long as an exchange has occurred, most agreements will be upheld because “[c]ourts do
not inquire into the value or adequacy of the consideration,” which “may be minimal—even a
peppercorn”).
61. See Snyder, supra note 19, at 49–52 (explaining how the contract doctrine of promissory
restitution arose out of the situation in Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935)).
62. Webb, 168 So. at 196.
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from life-threatening injury and in doing so permanently injured
63
himself. The employer responded by agreeing to pay him a pension
for the rest of his life.64 After the employer’s death, however, his
65
estate refused to continue payment to the employee. Because there
were no workers’ compensation statutes at the time, the employee
was without a remedy.66 To provide one, the court fashioned a
contractual solution even though there was no mutual consideration
in the classic contracts sense. That solution was its holding that the
employer’s moral obligation to pay, combined with the material
benefit of the employee’s saving his life, created a contractual
obligation.67 Because the holding in Webb has subsequently been
applied outside the employment context, contract law encompasses
this expanded and much less precise definition of consideration and
thus makes the application of contract law in general less clear.68
Although contract and employment theories significantly
overlap, it is preferable that judges divorce the two rather than
69
continue this charade. Courts should be willing to formulate rules
governing the employment relationship without relying on a
contractual theory to support them. For handbooks analysis, this
means moving away from contractual approaches; for example, it
means ignoring handbook disclaimers entirely, even if in contract law
courts ordinarily abide by all the terms an agreement contains.70
3. Normative Problems with a Contractual Approach to
Employment. Relying exclusively on either of the two predominant
approaches—requiring additional consideration or allowing unilateral
modification by the employer—creates substantial normative
problems. For instance, insisting that employers provide additional
consideration before modifying their handbooks would likely
discourage employers from issuing handbooks at all—even when their
procedures would clarify employees’ rights—as businesses would be

63. Id. at 196–97.
64. Id. at 197.
65. Id.
66. Snyder, supra note 19, at 50.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 52.
69. See id. at 34 (“[C]ontract law seems to be applied differently in employment cases than
in cases involving commercial transactions.”).
70. For a complete discussion of why disclaimers should be ignored entirely, see infra Part
II.B.3.
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trapped into rigid, inflexible business practices. On the other hand,
permitting unilateral modification by an employer allows business
owners to make all sorts of grand promises that have no binding
effect, enticing employees to start or continue working only to have
those promises whisked away at the employer’s whim.
a. Additional Consideration Required for Modification. Those
who support requiring additional consideration point out that
employees rely on handbooks and that employers expect them to do
so; thus, it is counterintuitive to think that employers would be
“harmed” by forcing them to abide by the policies they purposely
promulgated in the first place.71 For instance, in Toroysan v.
72
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals the plaintiff employee agreed
to work for the employer in part because of the manual’s promise that
he could only be fired for cause.73 Consequently, the court held that
the manual created rights for the employee, rights which could not be
subsequently reduced without providing the employee additional
consideration.74 Moreover, if employers derive some benefit from
issuing handbooks, they should not be able to avoid the costs incident
to that benefit; they owe the employees something upon changing
those procedures that provided the employer with some benefit from
the employees.
Yet it makes little sense practically to require employers, who
decide of their own accord to issue a statement of the company’s
policies to then provide consideration to later modify that policy.
Employers have no obligation or duty to issue a handbook in the first
place, so having done so, they should be allowed to modify or rescind
the handbooks at their own discretion, assuming they have made
clear their intent not to form a binding contract. Rather, the point of
handbooks is to help both employer and employee by making the
conditions of the workplace more uniform and clear without limiting
the employer’s ability to alter those conditions in the future as
deemed necessary. Moreover, from an economic perspective, it is

71. See Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1147 (Ill. 1999) (“Employers who
choose to set forth policies in employee handbooks and manuals as an inducement to attracting
and retaining a skilled and loyal work force cannot disregard those obligations at a later time,
simply because the employer later perceives them to be inconvenient or burdensome.”).
72. Toroysan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., 662 A.2d 89 (Conn. 1995).
73. Id. at 98.
74. Id. at 98–99.
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(arguably) inefficient to prevent employers from unilaterally
75
modifying their own company policies once implemented.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against requiring
additional consideration is that proscribing unilateral modification of
handbooks would be an unwieldy and impractical policy for
employers to implement. Such a rule would become a logistical
nightmare, as a company manual “could never be changed short of
successful renegotiation with each employee who worked while the
76
policy was in effect.” Problems with holdouts, dates of hiring, and
various manuals that had been previously issued would mean that
employers could have drastically different obligations to many
77
different employees. For instance, a company might owe some of its
employees who had accepted a modification no guarantees of process
before dismissal, even though others could only be fired after
progressive discipline, as they had never agreed to the additional
consideration offered to modify an original handbook. The result
would be to discourage employers from issuing handbooks altogether,
or alternatively to provide manuals with especially vague terms and
conditions. Consequently, the benefits gained by employees from
having manuals78—even in the absence of concrete, legally
enforceable rights—would be lost.
Advocates of employee rights, however, could counter that
businesses frequently self-impose situations in which they owe
differing obligations to various employees, such as individualized pay
rates. Consequently, the risk of owing different handbook-originated

75. Businesses, like market conditions, are ever-changing. If handbooks create rights for
employees that cannot be unilaterally changed, then businesses would face significant obstacles
preventing an efficient adjustment to the market. Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112,
120 (Mich. 1989). Allowing unilateral modification by employers leaves businesses the flexibility
presumably needed to meet evolving business necessities. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 218–19
(“[T]he employer distributes the original handbook seeking to secure good will and increased
productivity.”).
76. Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120.
77. Pratt, supra note 3, at 219.
78. Employees—like their employers—benefit from an orderly, cohesive workplace in
which they (generally) know what to expect, even if those rights are not legally guaranteed. See
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980) (“[W]here an
employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. The employer secures an
orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with
job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.”); Walters, supra note 4, at 381
(noting that employers, through handbooks, “foster a loyal and orderly work environment and
help to produce a more productive, cohesive work force”).
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duties to different employees does not appear to be a great concern.
But this argument fails when faced with the underlying purpose and
nature of handbooks: to bring clarity and organization to the
79
workforce so that it may be more efficient, orderly, and loyal. Thus,
employers who originally promulgate handbooks to structure the
workplace would refrain from doing so if they might have the
opposite effect of making it less orderly, for example, by owing
conflicting duties to various employees. Although differences in pay
are often kept confidential80—often purposely by the employees
themselves—varying handbook duties to employees would
presumably be very public and foster discord among the workforce.
For instance, employees who accept offered consideration for a
modification might view those holding out as troublemakers, whereas
“hold-outs” in turn might view the others as caving to the demands of
the employer. Thus, the cumulative impact of this rule is to
thoroughly discourage employers from creating handbooks in the first
place. As a result, those courts that require additional consideration
have created—for the vast majority of employers and employees
alike—a recipe for disaster.
b. Employers May Unilaterally Modify Handbooks. Yet the
other approach commonly used—permitting unilateral modification
by the employer—can unquestionably be harsh: employers may make
lavish promises to employees through handbooks, enticing them to
work or continue to work (perhaps for lesser compensation), and
then withdraw those promises at any time for their own convenience.
For instance, in Grovier v. North Sound Bank81 an employee starting
at a bank received a handbook stating that she would become a
permanent employee after passing a probationary period, after which
she could only be terminated for just cause.82 Two years later the bank
rescinded this provision and eliminated sick leave as well as holiday
83
and vacation pay. Moreover, the bank told her she would be

79. Slawson, supra note 9, at 24; Walters, supra note 4, at 381.
80. Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”:
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004)
(“[D]iscussion by individuals of their salaries . . . can be seen as violating an American ‘social
norm.’”).
81. Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
82. Id. at 813–14.
83. Id. at 814.
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terminated if she did not sign the new handbook within three days.
The court upheld her dismissal for refusing to sign, arguing that “[t]he
law should not tie employers to anachronistic policies in perpetuity.”85
86
Likewise, Sadler v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative upheld an
employee’s termination during a company restructuring despite his
having been employed for four years and informed via handbook that
87
permanent employees like him could only be fired for just cause. A
handbook issued just before his firing defined just cause for the first
time as including terminations for company restructuring.88 The court
found for the employer, and it bluntly stated the absoluteness of the
unilateral modification rule: “[T]he employer can define the work
relationship. Once an employer takes action, for whatever reasons, an
employee must either accept those changes, quit, or be discharged.
Because the employer retains this control over the employment
relationship, unilateral acts of the employer are binding on his
employees and both parties should understand this rule.”89
In response to the harshness of the rule permitting absolute
unilateral modification, which would potentially open the door to all
sorts of abuses by employers, the majority of courts permit employers
to unilaterally modify only if they first provide reasonable notice to
90
their employees. For instance, the California Supreme Court held in
Asmus v. Pacific Bell 91 that a written promise of employment security
could be unilaterally modified with reasonable notice, and it found
that the two years after the promise’s modification was “ample”
time.92 Although other courts follow this rule, no definitive statement
has been adopted as to what constitutes “reasonable notice.”93 In

84. Id.
85. Id. at 816.
86. Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1988).
87. Id. at 296–97.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 300 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash.
1984)).
90. Walters, supra note 4, at 387.
91. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 80 (Cal. 2000).
92. Id. at 80.
93. Id. (“Employees were provided ample advance notice of the termination, and the
present plaintiffs even enjoyed at least two more years of employment.”). The Sixth Circuit has
said, alternatively, that one month may be valid, e.g., Highstone v. Westin Eng’g, Inc., 187 F.3d
548, 553 (6th Cir. 1999), but also that mere distribution of the handbook counts, Mannix v.
County of Monroe, 348 F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2003). Generally, it appears that courts only
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Grovier, for instance, the court stated that reasonable notice meant
no more than actual notice, and so an employee receiving a modified
handbook alone was sufficient for the unilateral modification to be
94
valid. An immediate concern over this lack of specificity is that if
constructive or actual notice of a modification—such as through
distribution of a new handbook—is all the notice required, the
“reasonable notice” requirement becomes superfluous and dissolves
back into the harshness of the pure unilateral modification rule
because employers could still take advantage of their employees, just
so long as they told them about it. In contrast, by giving employees
fair warning of what is to come, the Asmus rule dulls the particularly
sharp blade wielded by employers under the unilateral modification
doctrine.
But this toned-down version of the rule—requiring reasonable
notice before unilateral modification is permissible—presents
analytical problems. Although the courts that follow this reasoning
say they do so applying traditional contract law,95 that claim rests on
96
shaky legal ground. Assuming the initial issuance of the handbook
was a valid offer accepted by the employee’s continuing to work, later
allowing an employer to modify the handbook unilaterally soundly
conflicts with traditional requirements for contract modification: the
employee’s acceptance of the original offer means that the employer
may not revoke because the acceptance creates an option contract
that the employer may not unilaterally rescind or alter.97 Yet the
offeror remains free to undo the option contract by providing
additional consideration in exchange for its cancellation.98 Even
though the result achieved by the Asmus approach may be more fair,
the validity of its reasoning under contract principles is tenuous at
best. Moreover, the vagueness among courts following this approach
over what constitutes “reasonable” notice does little to resolve the
confusion over handbook jurisprudence and may at times offer scant
protection to abused workers.

require that the employer make reasonable efforts to notify employees of the change. Apps,
supra note 55, at 898.
94. Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 817 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
95. Walters, supra note 4, at 407.
96. Asmus, 999 P.2d at 82 (George, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s analysis is
“entirely inconsistent with fundamental tenets of contract law”).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981); Walters, supra note 4, at 411.
98. Walters, supra note 4, at 416–17.
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4. The Unfair Results of Handbook Disclaimers. A “disclaimer”
is exactly what it purports to be, that is, a statement in a handbook
that disavows any notion that the handbook creates binding promises
upon the employer. The general rule is that an employer can prevent
the formation of a contract by making clear its intent not to make an
offer, although a disclaimer is not necessarily dispositive.99 Some
courts further require that the language be clear and conspicuous, and
much litigation has resulted from whether a statement in a handbook
claiming to disavow contractual liability meets the standard necessary
100
to do so. Courts often place great emphasis on the presence or
absence of disclaimers. Many, if not most, state that disclaimers
usually prevent a handbook from being construed as an offer.101 The
corollary is that the absence of a disclaimer makes the manual
presumptively binding.102 This analysis is not uniform, however. For
example, courts sometimes hold that even in the presence of
disclaimers, a handbook may create a binding contract if the content
of the manual substantially conflicts with the disclaimer.103 Similarly,
the failure to expressly disclaim binding obligations may not have any
104
effect on the analysis. Still, most courts hold that disclaimers
expressly denying any intention to create a contractual offer
effectively preclude the formation of any contractual obligation by
the employer through the handbook.105

99. E.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Iowa 1995); 82 AM.
JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 25 (2003).
100. Anderson, 540 N.W.2d at 287–88 (emphasizing that “[t]he requirement that a
disclaimer be conspicuous has given rise to much litigation” before noting that “[a] disclaimer
should be considered in the same manner as any other language in the handbook”).
101. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (stating that for an employer to avoid creating a contract, “[a]ll that need
be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement that there is
no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual”).
102. Keith J. Rosenblatt, New Jersey’s Recent Employment Manual Decisions: Traditional
Contract Law Abandoned in Favor of an Employee’s Unreasonable Expectations, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1496, 1505 (1995) (stating the rule as “absent an adequate disclaimer, an
employer may be bound to the ‘promises’ made in an employee handbook, regardless of an
employee’s at-will status.”).
103. See, e.g., Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708 (Vt. 2002)
(“Notwithstanding the disclaimer on the first page . . . the manual goes on to establish . . . an
elaborate system governing employee discipline and discharge.”).
104. See Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Mich. 1989) (“An employer
may, without an express reservation of the right to do so, unilaterally change its written policy
[in a handbook].”).
105. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 25 (2003).
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This approach can, as expected, have particularly harsh
consequences. Namely, employees who have either no written
contract or particularly vague contracts may receive most of their
terms of employment in a handbook containing a disclaimer. These
handbooks can make especially grandiose promises regarding
anything from compensation to vacation to dismissal procedures, and
employees may quite reasonably come to rely on those promises,
believing them to be binding. This may be particularly true in
situations in which the disclaimer is largely buried, i.e., through
placement, font, and the like, but is not legally inconspicuous. As a
result, employees may work years under the expectation that certain
promises in a handbook are enforceable and then be blindsided
without recourse when the employer unilaterally modifies those
promises.
In contrast, employers who simply omit a disclaimer—perhaps
negligently by not hiring an attorney to read through the manual—yet
have no intention of creating binding promises may be bound in
perpetuity to quite restrictive, even damaging promises. In particular,
promises of “continued employment,” which may have been merely
statements of good faith on the part of the employer to act fairly,
could be construed as statements changing employment from at will
to just cause. Thus, employers and employees alike may be unfairly
harmed when courts place heavy reliance on disclaimers.
II. PROPOSED RULES FOR HANDBOOK MODIFICATION
A. A Threshold Matter: Why Handbooks Should Be Enforceable
Before discussing what the rules should be regarding
modification of handbooks, it is important to answer the threshold
question of why handbooks should ever be given legally binding force
at all. First, in many instances employee handbooks may provide the
only concrete description of the employment relationship. Many
employers leave crucially important terms and conditions of an
employee’s work for a handbook, including terms such as vacation
106
time, bonuses, just cause, disciplinary procedures, and so forth.
Refusing to find handbooks enforceable would make any
employment remedy in favor of the employee nearly nonexistent, as
employers could inequitably put nearly all the promises of the
106.

Arnow-Richman, supra note 34, at 2.
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relationship into the handbook, knowing these promises would be
107
unenforceable. It would be a bizarre rule that would leave judicially
unregulated, either contractually or equitably, a relationship as
fundamentally important to people’s lives as their relationship with
an employer. Second, employers issue handbooks for their own
benefit.108 To allow them the advantage provided by the handbook
without any reciprocal detriment would smack of injustice. Finally,
109
employees rely on handbooks. Frequently they do so at the
insistence of their employers, who often require them to sign or
acknowledge receipt or having read the handbook as a condition of
beginning employment.110 Thus, employers expect employees to rely
on handbooks and employees are cognizant of that expectation, so
enforcing the handbooks’ provisions would not be unfairly catching
the employer or employee off guard.
B. Proposed Rules
1. The Requirement of Additional Consideration Is Abandoned,
but the Unilateral Modification Rule Must in Turn Adopt a Proper
111
Reasonableness Standard. Based on the problems discussed,
requiring additional consideration is neither practical nor desirable
before an employer may modify a handbook; allowing absolute
unilateral modification, however, produces unjust and harsh results.
The answer is to tone down the absolute modification rule, which

107. See Small v. Springs Indus., 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (S.C. 1987) (“It is patently unjust to
allow an employer to couch a handbook, bulletin, or other similar material in mandatory terms
and then allow him to ignore these very policies as ‘a gratuitous, nonbinding statement of
general policy’ whenever it works to his advantage.” (quoting Walker v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985))); Pratt, supra note 3, at 210 (“If company policies
are not worth the paper on which they are printed, then it would be better not to mislead
employees by distributing them.”).
108. Pratt, supra note 3, at 213.
109. Courts often use employees’ reliance on a handbook’s terms as a threshold matter for
determining whether the handbook is legally enforceable. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984
P.2d 1138, 1147 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that commitments in a handbook are enforceable if they
may be reasonably relied upon by employees). Other courts are even more categorical as to
reliance: “[Having been] issue[d] a handbook, an employee may rely on the provisions to state a
claim for relief.” Jones v. Denver Pub. Sch., 427 F.3d 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 2005). That
employees sue at all to enforce handbooks suggests that they regarded the handbooks terms as
in some way binding.
110. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 206 (“Some employers require each employee to read and
sign her manual.”).
111. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.

06__YODER.DOC

1538

5/27/2008 1:57:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1517

courts in essence do when they require reasonable notice before
112
unilateral modification, as in Asmus. Yet reasonable notice is not
the panacea that courts might purport it to be, as no clear notion of
what constitutes “reasonable notice” has yet been determined. An
ever-present risk remains that by not setting a clear time requirement
for reasonable notice, the Asmus rule effectively dissolves back into
the unforgiving rule permitting unilateral modification at any time.
Thus the mission is for courts to ensure that “reasonable notice” is, in
fact, reasonable to make its promise of overcoming the harshness of
unilateral modification more than illusory.
2. Defining “Reasonable” Notice for Handbook Modification
Depends upon the Nature of the Promise Being Amended. If the
“reasonable notice” requirement of the Asmus rule is what prevents
the unilateral modification of handbooks from having unduly harsh
consequences, what constitutes “reasonable” must be established.
The rule dissolves back into its unjust progenitor if “reasonable
notice” does not provide an adequate benefit to the employee; in
other words, the notice must provide the means by which employees
can in some way enforce the benefits they originally accepted by
continuing to work after receipt of the manual. Even though several
courts have adopted a rule similar to that in Asmus,113 there is yet no
uniform approach as to what constitutes reasonable notice.114
Moreover, there is not a particularly large amount of precedent on
this issue. Some courts merely look at the manner in which the
modification was imparted to the employees, upholding the unilateral
change so long as the “method employed [is] uniform and
reasonable.”115 They tend to hold that so long as constructive notice is
given, the change is valid.116 Others also look at the length of time
provided to the employee before the change takes place. For
example, in Asmus, the plaintiffs were given five months’ notice
before the policy took effect and worked for two years after the
modified policy was in place; the court found this “ample advance

112. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
113. See Walters, supra note 4, at 398 (noting specifically California, North Dakota, Utah,
and Virginia).
114. See Apps, supra note 55, at 897–98 (detailing various courts’ time frames).
115. Grow v. Gen. Prods., Inc., 457 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
116. Apps, supra note 55, at 898.
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117
notice.” Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has said that one month’s
advance notice was reasonable.118
For notice to be reasonable it should meet both prongs, namely,
that the modification of the handbook be reasonable in manner and
time. Accordingly, this Note argues that for notice to be reasonable
(1) it must include a time requirement, and (2) the amount of time
necessary should vary depending upon the nature of the promise.

a. The Necessity of a Time Requirement. Courts that allow
unilateral modification without requiring any time delay before the
modification takes effect miss a major point of why reasonable notice
should be required in the first place. If unilateral modification is at
times unjust precisely because the employer can invoke it at any
moment on a whim, then simply requiring the employer to tell
employees about the change does not resolve the problem at all.
Instead, the employer should be required to allow a sufficient amount
of time to give employees fair warning, a period in which they may
still assert their rights should the employer attempt to make the
modified handbook take effect immediately.
The immediate issue is how anyone can pick a time that is
“reasonable.” In so doing, a court should necessarily consider the
position of the employee, i.e., the time needed to consider the new
policy and even find other employment if the changes are
unpalatable. At the same time, the position of the employer should be
a factor. For instance, any time an employer can show absolute
business necessity—more than simply changed business conditions—
the modification should be immediately allowed. Finally, the amount
of time necessary to be “reasonable” should be based on the type of
promise made, as employees likely place much greater importance on
some types of promises—for example, those relating to compensation
may be more zealously guarded than disciplinary procedures.
A time requirement would resolve the fundamental
inconsistency inherent in evaluating employer modification: it would
bridge the gap between an employer’s intent not to bind itself to
handbook policies and an employee’s expectations that those
promises are not meaningless. Granted it is not a perfect solution;

117. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000) (stating the rule that an employer could
unilaterally modify an employment handbook “after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice,
and without interfering with the employee’s vested benefits”).
118. Highstone v. Westin Eng’g, Inc., 187 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
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employees would still face the prospect that the procedures and
policies under which they have been employed may be modified in
the future at the sole discretion of their employer. But they would at
least know that such changes cannot take place immediately but
rather only after they have been given a fair chance to consider what
is at stake.
b. The Amount of Time That Is Reasonable Should Vary
Depending upon the Promise. The amount of time that is reasonable
should depend upon the nature of the benefits at stake, with
modifications that involve promises affecting substantive rights
requiring longer notice to be valid than those impacting largely
procedural rights. For benefits that are largely procedural—such as
disciplinary procedures—the amount of time deemed reasonable
should be particularly small, for example, perhaps just a few days and
no more than one month. This length accords with the reasonable
expectations of the employee: although some particular employees
might place paramount emphasis on a company’s disciplinary
procedures,119 it is doubtful that the majority of employees place as
much importance on such promises as they do for substantive ones.120
Substantive changes almost surely affect employees’ personal lives—
for instance, by changing compensation or vacation time—whereas
procedural changes, like changes to disciplinary procedures for a
model employee, may never impact an employee at all. Employees
most likely are able to adapt more easily to procedural rather than
substantive changes, and so less notice is required.
In either case, the importance of allowing an employer to change
its internal operating procedures substantially outweighs the
relatively small importance placed upon those policies by the
employee. Thus, the requisite time needed to modify should be small.
Because one business week is ordinarily adequate for other business119. For instance, imagine an employee who previously had been dismissed for a job after
cruising the Internet in violation of company policy although the employee was unaware it was
wrong to do so. In the future, the employee might be more inclined to accept an offer from a
company that requires an initial warning for minor infractions before termination is
appropriate.
120. Courts typically do not require actual notice, in part, because employees often do not
read their employment manuals at all. E.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d
277, 285 (Iowa 1995) (noting that the plaintiff did not read the handbook). But just because
employees have not read the manual should not imply that they are not aware of its contents.
Employees are probably made aware of major provisions (and violations of them) by other
coworkers or the employer itself.
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related activities, it seems an adequate minimum for notice to be
“reasonable” for handbook modifications. Additionally, it is easy to
infer from an employer who feels a compelling need to change a
handbook provision immediately (in less than one week) that it is
doing so in bad faith or from improper motives. For instance, the
employer may be altering commission rates just before several
employees complete a large sale. Thus, one week should not be an
unreasonable burden upon employers to wait for changes to take
effect.
At the other end of the spectrum are those provisions that
specifically involve substantive promises, such as statements
concerning wages, raises, and bonuses. Employees who have already
performed work under a promise of compensation made in an
employment manual should always be entitled to that pay. Courts
should be most hesitant to allow employers to modify these promises
on short notice as they are undeniably fundamental to the
employment relationship. Employees who have their compensation
altered are probably much more likely to consider seeking
employment elsewhere than those who have procedural rights
changed and hence need adequate time to do so. An adequate period
may be one business quarter, or roughly three months. This span is a
basic unit by which businesses measure their recent productivity and
make fundamental business decisions concerning their future
actions.121
Troublesome situations arise when employees are promised
procedures that directly affect substantive rights, such as rules that
provide for standard-track promotions, raises, advances, etc. These
circumstances necessarily involve a blend of procedure and substance,
making it more difficult to determine the weight that should be
accorded such provisions. Consider, for example, a fairly typical
employment manual that sets forth the conditions for applying for
and receiving tenure for a college professor. Here the rules
specifically concern the procedure that is to be followed by the
college and the professor in the course of the employment
relationship, but they also significantly impact the professor’s

121. See ANDREA SAVERI ET AL., INST. FOR THE FUTURE, TOWARD A NEW LITERACY OF
COOPERATION IN BUSINESS: MANAGING DILEMMAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 53 (Maureen Davis
ed., 2004) (“Entrepreneurial capitalism, typified by the United States, is rooted in individual
entrepreneurialism and free market principles, organized around the business quarter as its
main timeframe.”).

06__YODER.DOC

1542

5/27/2008 1:57:58 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1517

substantive rights, notably the professor’s promotion, salary, and job
security. In such circumstances, the amount of time necessary would
122
be more fact dependent, but the general principles would still apply.
The proper time frame for such promises would fall in between the
two time frames mentioned, i.e., one week to three months, and could
be adjusted toward either end of the range depending on whether the
change is more procedural or more substantive.
Promises that an employee can be terminated only for just cause
are similarly problematic, for this situation too deals with rights both
substantive (being fired) and procedural (allowing the employee
notice and a hearing). These cases would likely be highly fact
dependent. Ordinarily, courts should be wary about attributing too
much weight to supposed just cause provisions, as employers may
commonly include language that resembles such a promise but
123
without the intention of changing the employee’s status from at will.
Instead, the employer is simply stating its own desire, in general, not
to dismiss employees without reason, but it is by no means binding
itself. Nonetheless, when courts do find that provisions in a handbook
give rise to a promise that an employee can only be fired for just
cause, modification should require a reasonable amount of time equal
to that of changed compensation, that is, one business quarter, as justcause provisions are closely akin to promises of payment.124
As recommended in this Part, ordinarily the shortest time that
could be considered “reasonable” should be one week, and the
longest necessary would be three months. Yet several circumstances
could alter these periods. Specific cases may, in the interest of justice
for either the employer or employee, require either a shorter or
longer span respectively. Additionally, employers should be allowed
to show that they follow a separate, internal practice to essentially
establish their own standard intervals. For instance, a company with
regular two-month reviews that are used to establish compensation
would have a legitimate argument that the three-month threshold for
unilaterally modifying wage provisions in a handbook should be
122. For a more complete discussion of what constitutes “reasonable notice” in this
situation, see supra Part III.C.
123. Employers may make statements of their general desire not to fire people, such as “So
long as your work is performed satisfactorily, you will always have a place at Company X.” This
sort of statement, however, is probably better characterized as simply an offer of good will than
any real intention to create a binding just-cause contract.
124. For example, employees may elect to take lower pay with the expectation that they
cannot be fired without good reason.
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reduced to reflect its own adopted two-month period. Such an
approach on the surface would be reasonable as employees would
have come to reasonably expect it. In the absence of mitigating
circumstances or specific employer practices, the suggested guidelines
could be applied across the board.
Case law justifies such an approach, as various courts have
implicitly adopted a reasonable length of time approach to finding an
125
employer’s unilateral modification valid. Nevertheless, this Note’s
126
approach is difficult to square with traditional contract principles.
Applying contract law strictly to handbook cases would have either of
two negative effects: (1) employers would have to provide additional
consideration to modify, which is undesirable, or (2) courts trying to
do the right thing in employment cases would further bend contract
law into bizarre shapes. Consequently, courts should be willing to
abandon their reliance on contract law as a beacon to guide them
through the fog of employment decisions. Searching for a reasonable
time requirement is not a contract-based solution but rather one
founded on notions of fairness uniquely aimed at the employment
relationship.
3. As a Further Step toward Fairness, Disclaimers Should Be
Entirely Irrelevant. An initial step toward achieving the goal of
fundamental fairness would be to eliminate from handbook analysis
the typically heavy reliance courts place on the existence or absence
of disclaimers. Those cases that follow the majority approach
regarding disclaimers—using them effectively as a per se rule against
finding an implied contract in a handbook—reveal the underlying
problem behind looking at disclaimers in general: disclaimers are
weighted too heavily. In reality, disclaimers say very little about the
intentions of the employer issuing the handbook or the employee
relying upon it. The argument in favor of a bright-line rule is that
disclaimers reveal the employer’s true intent to avoid creating a
contract and that no reasonable employee could therefore conclude
the handbook was an offer.127 Employers generally would prefer that
125. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
126. See discussion supra Part I.B.
127. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 287–88 (Iowa 1995) (“A
disclaimer can prevent the formation of a contract by clarifying the intent of the employer not to
make an offer. . . . [W]e simply examine the language and context of the disclaimer to decide
whether a reasonable employee . . . would understand it to mean that the employer has not
assented to be bound by the handbook’s provisions.”).
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disclaimers prohibit the creation of a contract, for they would almost
128
always prefer to limit their liability to their employees. The
problem, then, is that employers can promise too much if they know
they can always avoid being contractually bound. Courts, of course,
do recognize this and sometimes ignore disclaimers in such
instances.129 Yet by viewing disclaimers as an absolute bar or even
presumptively favoring them, courts implicitly favor the position of
employers; i.e., they unfairly reduce or eliminate employer liability to
employees despite the benefits gained by the employer in issuing the
handbook. At the same time, courts may sometimes penalize
businesses that simply omit a disclaimer or do not word it strongly
enough. It is difficult to understand why, if courts assume that
employers generally do not want to be bound by the terms in their
handbooks, the presence (or absence) of language stating exactly that
becomes determinative. If courts recognize the competing forces at
issue behind all handbook litigation—employers’ desire to disclaim
and employees’ reliance on the handbook—there is no compelling
reason to consider disclaimers beyond unnecessary reliance on
traditional contract analysis.130
In addition to the basic unfairness of allowing disclaimers to
preclude liability is the practical problem that examining and creating
rules governing when disclaimers are effective is a legal mess. Courts
analyzing handbooks for implied contracts usually take a two-step

128. Professor David Slawson argues that employers would prefer the additional
consideration for unilateral modification rule as it would provide a tool for retaining employees.
Slawson, supra note 9, at 30, 32. His argument is unpersuasive for two reasons: first, an
employer who did want to expressly provide a just-cause provision to employees could do so
through a written contract separate from the handbook; and, second, employers who want to
retain employees through promises in a handbook would simply not violate those promises (by
unilaterally modifying them) in the first place.
129. E.g., Dillon v. Champion Jogbra, Inc., 819 A.2d 703, 708 (Vt. 2002) (“[T]he presence of
such a disclaimer is not dispositive . . . .”).
130. This overemphasis on disclaimers is another regrettable result stemming from the
union of contract and employment law. Specifically, disclaimers are used by courts as evidence
of what a reasonable employee would believe the bargain to be; in other words, it is considered
part of a contract between individual parties. Employment manuals—often the only source of
terms defining the employment relation—should, however, be considered representative of the
symbiotic employer-employee relationship. Yet, Professor Slawson takes the position that
unilateral modification without additional consideration should be allowed provided an
employer “had the foresight to reserve the right to do so.” Slawson, supra note 9, at 28. This
position demonstrates the basic problem: if courts are more concerned about achieving
equitable results in employment than ordinarily with contracts, simply having the “foresight” to
add one or two lines to an otherwise voluminous employment manual should have very little
determinative weight.

06__YODER.DOC

2008]

5/27/2008 1:57:58 PM

HOW REASONABLE IS “REASONABLE”?

1545

analysis: first, they inquire whether a disclaimer is valid, and if so,
131
they turn to whether the handbook has created a binding contract.
The type of analysis used when looking at disclaimers is particularly
tedious. Courts often determine a disclaimer’s conspicuousness by
examining everything from the language and placement of the
disclaimer to its font, size, color, and location.132 Because the presence
of a disclaimer is often not determinative as a matter of law of
133
whether a contract has been formed or not, courts’ analysis of
handbooks requires an extra step in litigation, i.e., initially
determining the validity of the disclaimer. In addition, courts’
decisionmaking processes become much more subjective as they must
inquire whether a reasonable employee would have found the
particular disclaimer at issue sufficiently conspicuous to avoid
creating a binding contract.
Entirely disregarding disclaimers could eliminate much of the
uncertainty involved in handbook jurisprudence. In addition, such a
step would free courts from the often minute and tedious inquiries
they must make concerning the clarity of a disclaimer. In the end, the
use of disclaimers flows completely from the application of contract
law to the employment situation—their presence indicates the
employer’s desire not to create an offer. Recognizing the employment
relationship as one of status would allow courts to abandon this
overemphasis on disclaimers, which has particularly unjust results by
134
absolutely denying employees entrance to the courtroom.
C. Objections to These Rules and Their Responses
Immediate concerns with the rules proposed in this Note include
the possibilities that (1) employers who modify many provisions in a
handbook would face practical difficulties because each change would
131. See, e.g., Anderson, 540 N.W.2d at 288–89 (“When examining the disclaimer we first
consider the text employed. . . . Second, we examine the scope of the disclaimer.”).
132. See, e.g., Durtsche v. Am. Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007, 1010–11 (10th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting a disclaimer that “was buried in a glossary definition, and there was no effort to
highlight the fact or the effect of the disclaimer”); Chambers v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 721 F. Supp.
1128, 1131 (D. Ariz. 1988) (enforcing a disclaimer displayed conspicuously in bold print in
introductory paragraph); Kumpf v. United Tel. Co., 429 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding a disclaimer inconspicuous when “located on the last page of the document under the
heading ‘CONCLUSION’. . . . [because] [i]t was neither capitalized, bolded, set apart with
distinctive border, or in contrasting type or color”).
133. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 25 (2003).
134. For further detail on the sometimes unjust results that reliance on disclaimers can have,
see supra Part I.B.4.
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require a different length of time before it would be “reasonable”; (2)
a good faith standard applied to employer modification could more
easily achieve the same desirable results; and (3) ignoring disclaimers
would dissuade employers from ever issuing handbooks at all, which
would in turn harm employees.
An initial concern with the approach suggested by this Note is
that because the length of time required for modification to be
reasonable depends upon the nature of the provision changed,
different lengths of time would have to pass before all of a
handbook’s provisions would become valid. The result, therefore,
would be a staggered effect in which various modifications are
permitted at varying intervals. Analogously, under the additional
consideration approach, employers might potentially owe different
obligations to different employees depending upon who received
what version of the handbook and who has accepted the modification.
Under this Note’s approach, employers could face a comparable
situation in which they modify a handbook’s provisions regarding
disciplinary procedures, just-cause provisions, and compensatory
promises at once, and as a result, the amount of reasonable notice
required for each modification would differ. The worry is that this
would be confusing for employers to administer and difficult for
employees to understand.
There are several counterarguments. First, the modified
handbook would still be uniform among the employees, so it would
avoid the primary evils of the additional consideration approach.
Specifically, employers would not have to administer policies that
affect individual employees differently, and employees would not face
the internal discord that may arise when they are treated differently
by the employer depending upon who has agreed to the new
handbook. Second, the employer would know when its various
modifications come into effect, so it would not be particularly
troublesome to implement administratively. Similarly, employees
would benefit from the more bright-line knowledge of what fair
warning they deserve from employers wishing to modify the terms of
their employment. Third, claims likely would arise only when the lack
of notice was egregious concerning one of the provisions in the
contract, and so courts would not have to sort through various time
issues for each provision of the handbook. Finally, this approach
would fairly represent the reasonable expectations of both parties, in
particular the employees. Simply put, it is more reasonable to expect
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that an employer can flexibly alter its procedural policies than its pay
schedules.
Another objection is that the concept of good faith, if rigorously
applied, could likewise eliminate the rough edges of the unilateral
135
modification rule. More specifically, courts could apply a good faith
standard to the acts of employers, prohibiting unilateral modification
in instances when an employer’s act was duplicitous, e.g., altering
commission rates just before an employee closes a large sale or
eliminating a large promise intended to attract employees. If so, then
traditional contract principles could continue to be applied without
doctrinal inconsistency or the problem of unfair results. Good faith
fails, however, because it takes into account only the employer’s
position. Thus, employers who grossly abuse their use of employment
manuals to make promises to employees would be prohibited from
doing so under the good faith doctrine. But employers who act in
good or neutral faith in modifying their manuals would still be able to
do so without providing reasonable notice. For example, an employer
may state in a handbook that all employees may only be fired for just
cause; one year later, however, the employer feels an economic
downturn coming and returns all employees to at-will status. Doing so
would not be in bad faith—nonetheless, immediately modifying the
employees’ status without reasonable notice is unjust to them. In this
analysis, employees’ positions are entirely ignored; demanding that
employers provide fair warning is more a safeguard to protect
employees than it is to ensure that employers are not acting for
improper motives.
A final objection concerns the practical effect of denying
handbook disclaimers any legal force. Opponents of this Note’s
position might readily counter that by removing any legal significance
from disclaimers, employers would be less likely to issue handbooks
at all, thus discouraging a practice that benefits employees as well as
employers. Employers could not be certain that the handbooks would
not create binding obligations. There are several counterarguments.
First, employers might still issue handbooks when they find that the
benefits derived from them outweigh the risks of litigation involving
one of the handbook’s promises. Due to this fear of litigation,

135. See Apps, supra note 55, at 916 (arguing that good faith can limit how employers may
modify a handbook, because good faith requires that the employer only exercise its power “in a
manner which does not destroy the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the
parties”).
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employers issuing handbooks would probably make their language
more precise and contain less lavish promises, in effect promoting the
goal of clarity in the employment relationship. Second, as argued in
this Part, employers should be allowed to modify unilaterally upon
reasonable notice, and so even if they are bound for a time, they
would always be able to subsequently modify without providing
additional consideration. Hence, the benefits of the handbook would
seem even greater next to the prospect of abiding by the handbook’s
promises for at least the short term.
III. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO HANDBOOK ANALYSIS
This Part provides three examples of fairly common workplace
arrangements and ensuing employer-employee conflicts. For each, it
illustrates how courts might resolve the conflict under various
approaches, and then demonstrates how courts should decide the
matter following the rules proposed by this Note.
A. John
An employee, John, works as a salesman on a commission basis;
his pay rates have been specified only in an employment handbook he
received two years previously. He received no written contract. The
handbook contains a disclaimer, which states only that “The
company’s Sales Plan does not constitute an offer by Company X.”
The rate of compensation he receives is highly favorable compared to
other employers in the market, and so John has turned down other
attractive job offers. Presently, he earns 30 percent for each sale he
makes, but his employer issues a new handbook reducing that amount
to 10 percent starting in two days. John is presently working on a sale
which he thinks will be completed in one week. He sues four months
later for all the commissions he was denied at the 30 percent rate after
the new handbook was issued.
The approaches taken by various courts could decide this in one
of several different ways. First, without a clear intent to form a
contract, the handbook could not have created an offer in the first
place, and so John has no recourse.136 Second, the handbook might
have created an offer, but the disclaimer effectively prevents it from

136. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 661 (Mo. 1988)
(declining to adopt a “handbook exception”).

06__YODER.DOC

2008]

5/27/2008 1:57:58 PM

HOW REASONABLE IS “REASONABLE”?

1549

137
being so, and John has no recourse. Third, the disclaimer could be
ignored in light of the nature of the other promises in the manual and
the employer must provide John with additional consideration to
138
change the handbook. Thus, John is entitled to the 30 percent rate
for all sales. Fourth, the handbook did create a valid offer, but the
employer may modify it at any time without additional consideration,
139
and John has no recourse. Fifth, the handbook did create a valid
offer and the employer could modify by providing “reasonable
notice;” John has recourse only if the notification was not
140
reasonable.
Besides illustrating the multiple and conflicting approaches taken
by different courts, this example is a simple vehicle for demonstrating
the flaws of courts’ present approaches to handbooks. A categorical
refusal to find handbooks binding on employers would be unfair to
employees, like John, whose pay rates have only been established by
a handbook. Allowing an employer to evade liability by grace of a
clearly worded disclaimer similarly reproduces this problem. But
requiring Company X to provide additional consideration to all
salesmen would be a tremendous burden on the employer. For
example, if the employer settles with most of its salespersons but John
holds out for more, the employer may be left in the unenviable
position of having various members of its sales force receiving various
compensation rates, which would be administratively difficult and
could foster disgruntled feelings among the employees. Yet allowing
the employer to unilaterally modify the handbook is also
unsatisfactory. John has remained loyal to his employer specifically
because of the excellent pay rates he receives; in addition, he is about
to receive a large commission which the employer erases by
modifying the handbook. The most attractive solution, therefore, is

137. See, e.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995) (holding
that an explicit disclaimer bars a handbook from constituting an offer to modify an employee’s
at-will employment).
138. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Ariz. 1999) (“Once an
employment contract is formed . . . a party may no longer unilaterally modify the terms of that
relationship.”).
139. E.g., Grovier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811, 815 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“An
employer may unilaterally amend or revoke policies and procedures established in an employee
handbook.”).
140. E.g., Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000) (“An employer may unilaterally
terminate a policy . . . after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice . . . .”).
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adopting a “reasonable notice” standard for the employer’s
modification.
Following the rules proposed by this Note, a court evaluating this
case should initially discard the disclaimer as irrelevant to the
analysis. Then, it should determine the type of promise at issue—in
this case, a substantive compensatory provision, which, as suggested,
should receive maximum deference for the length of time required to
be reasonable. Here, the employer provided notice of only one week,
which ordinarily should be regarded as insufficient warning to the
employee of a change affecting compensation. The drastic size of the
change (30 percent to 10 percent) indicates that John may very well
desire to find a more attractive position elsewhere and should receive
sufficient time to do it. In the absence of showing an actual business
need, the employer may be trying to unfairly profit by its employees’
previous reliance on the high commissions, further indicated by the
fact that John is about to close a large deal just days after the changes
will take effect.
As a result, John should be entitled to the 30 percent commission
rate for all of those sales made in the three months after notice of the
change was made. For the sales made in the fourth month, the court
should determine that John’s notice was by then reasonable and that
he is entitled to only the 10 percent commission rate. Although this
result is not doctrinally sanctioned by contract law, it is more
reasonable to both parties than results that would have entailed a
harsh result to either John or his employer.
B. Jane
Jane goes to work for a manufacturer and receives a one
hundred-page handbook. She acknowledges receipt of that handbook
in writing. The employer makes no other oral or written promises to
her. The handbook does not include a disclaimer, and it describes the
process by which Jane may become a permanent employee at the
company. Specifically, her first ninety days are her “probation
period,” after which she will be evaluated, and if her work is
acceptable, she will be offered a “permanent position for as long as
she chooses to remain with the company.” One year later, the
company issues a revision to the manual stating that all employees are
at will and that the handbook is not meant to create a binding
contract with any employee. Jane is fired in another six months,
despite having passed her probationary period. She sues, claiming
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that she is a permanent employee who, under the terms of the manual
she signed, can only be fired for just cause.
Under the rules proposed in this Note, Jane’s employer should
be entitled to summary judgment. The absence of a disclaimer in the
initial handbook should be disregarded by the court, as should the
later addition of a disclaimer. Next, because her termination occurred
sufficiently far after the modification (six months), she received
reasonable notice of the employer’s unilateral modification, and so it
was valid. In the absence of a clear contractual agreement changing
Jane’s status from an at-will employee, Jane gained no further rights
through the initial handbook and so has no recourse.
But under other analyses, this case might not be so simple. For
instance, courts that place heavy weight on the absence of a
disclaimer would probably conclude that initially the handbook
created a binding, implied contract and so Jane is entitled to
damages.141 Thus, the employer is penalized for neglecting to include
an initial disclaimer. And if the ultimate objective is fundamental
fairness, it seems odd to hold one employer liable and another not
based solely on the inclusion of a one-sentence disclaimer at the end
of a one hundred-page manual. Practically, it is doubtful that Jane’s
expectations changed dramatically based on the absence or inclusion
of the disclaimer. Similarly, if the employer truly wanted to create
binding obligations upon itself, it could have done so expressly;
instead, holding it liable is a large penalty to pay for a relatively slight
oversight.
Even after placing analysis of the disclaimer to the side, courts
would still reach widely disparate, and often unjust, results. In
jurisdictions that require additional consideration for modification,
Jane’s continuing to work after receiving the modified handbook is
insufficient to constitute acceptance, and so she would win damages.
On the other hand, courts that adamantly refuse to recognize
handbooks as ever creating employee rights would dismiss the case
outright. Both approaches claim to use black-letter contract law in
deciding Jane’s case, yet they reach diametrically opposed results. As
a result, contract law becomes less clear, and employees and
employers alike face uncertain outcomes when deciding whether to
litigate.
141. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (finding a just-cause provision in a handbook enforceable
when no disclaimer is present).
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In addition, other courts may get bogged down in the specific
language of the initial provision offering “permanent employment,”
debating whether a reasonable employee would deem that a promise
142
that she would only be fired for just cause. Still others, like the court
in Asmus, might reach the same conclusion suggested by this Note—
summary judgment for the employer—but would attend to the
tedious contract analysis involving the disclaimer and whether an
offer and acceptance had actually occurred in the first place.
The unfortunate result in all of these other contexts is that the
arguably fair result, permitting the employer’s modification without
penalty, requires a much greater degree of legal legwork before it is
reached. Thus, the courts’ time and resources are wasted on
particularly tedious and jurisdictionally inconsistent analysis. This
harms the courts, employees, and employers alike.
C. Fred
Fred receives a written contract as a professor at a local
university, but it states only his salary for the present year. Typically,
he renews a similar contract each year. Fred also receives a handbook
which is reissued every year, detailing the procedures that both
professors and the university’s board are to follow in deciding
whether faculty will receive tenure. Fred is halfway through the
process, which ordinarily takes six years. The handbook he receives
this year, however, is decidedly different from previous versions he
has received. This handbook entirely overhauls the tenure track
procedures, providing simply that after this semester, the university
will make tenure decisions at its own discretion. Fred is denied tenure
without being informed why and sues, claiming the university owed
him the process it had previously established.
In this case, courts that follow traditional contract principles, that
is, those that require additional consideration or even use promissory
estoppel, seem to get this right: the university cannot alter the
promises it made to Fred because an option contract was created
when Fred continued to teach under the promises of the initial
handbook. Thus, the university must provide the procedures it had
originally put in place for Fred. But because the additional
143
consideration approach is generally unsatisfactory, other courts

142.
143.

See supra note 132.
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.a.
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might turn to the Asmus rule of reasonable notice. Here, Fred has
probably received reasonable notice—an entire semester and
constructive notice—under a contract-based approach. Yet this
solution is undesirable based on the extent of what Fred has lost:
several years of work and preparation have vanished. Likewise,
courts that outright reject obligations arising from employment
handbooks would unfairly deny Fred any remedy.
What would be preferable, therefore, would be an
“employment,” rather than contract, reaction to whether Fred has
received reasonable notice. This is not an easy case to resolve, even
under this Note’s approach. For instance, allowing Fred to continue
his tenure track on the terms of the original contract—which he
wants—would force the university to abide by outdated policies for
another three years, policies which would not apply to other
professors. On the other hand, a court’s decision that six months’ time
is normally adequate notice would deny Fred a remedy entirely. The
“best” result would involve either creative, equitable relief by which
Fred would receive some form of the process he was denied, or
compensatory relief for the value of the time he has spent under the
assumptions of the original handbook. No clear solution appears; this
approach, however, points the way toward the two parties settling,
rather than providing either with an easy victory that would unfairly
and one-sidedly harm the other.
Although this Note’s approach is fairly open-ended in this case, it
offers a chance to avoid the harshness and rigidity of the two options
contracts analysis offers, either requiring complete obeisance by the
university to the terms of the original handbook or rejecting Fred’s
claim entirely.
CONCLUSION
To reduce the often harsh and unjust impact that an employer’s
use of manuals can have upon employees, a majority of courts
recognize that employers who issue handbooks to their workforce
may create contractual obligations.144 But courts remain largely
divided on the legal analysis that should be used in approaching the
issue of an employer’s obligations flowing from the issuance of a
handbook and the more problematic question of what happens when

144. See Pratt, supra note 3, at 216 (“[T]he majority of states . . . recognize a handbook
exception.”).
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that employer later attempts to unilaterally modify the promises
therein. Most claim to resolve the question using traditional contract
principles; even when applying the same terms and approaches,
145
however, these courts often reach entirely opposite results. This
unsatisfactory result in large part stems from the unfortunate
blending of employment and contract law, which produces cases
squeezing contract law into a shape it was not meant to fill. The most
palatable approach that courts have adopted is that used in Asmus v.
Pacific Bell, in which the court held that unilateral modification is
permissible so long as reasonable notice is provided.146 Yet this rule is
difficult to reconcile with traditional contract principles147 and no
standard definition of reasonable notice has been developed.148
Employment handbooks necessarily involve two competing
interests: employers generally prefer that handbooks not give rise to
binding obligations, whereas employees prefer that they do. The
reasonable expectations in this relationship probably fall somewhere
in between. At its simplest, this Note proposes adopting the Asmus
rule—under which employers may unilaterally modify handbooks so
long as they provide reasonable notice—and determining the length
of time that is “reasonable” based upon the particular term at issue in
the handbook. The length of time sufficient for notice to be
reasonable should depend upon the nature of the manual provision:
substantive changes, such as to compensation, require greater
advance warning than those affecting procedures, such as internal
company policies. This Note suggests that, ordinarily, the shortest
time that could be reasonable is one workweek, and the maximum is
one business quarter or three months. This rule would retain
employer flexibility while limiting the harshness of the unilateral
modification rule that otherwise would permit the employer to
promise nearly anything to its employees only to revoke such

145. Walters, supra note 4, at 384–85. Compare Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1145
(Ariz. 1999) (finding an employer’s unilateral modification of a handbook provision invalid
after applying uniltateral contracts analysis and noting “[c]ontinued employment after issuance
of a new handbook does not constitute acceptance”), with Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop.
431 N.W.2d 296, 298 (N.D. 1988) (finding an employer’s unilateral modification of a handbook
provision valid after applying unilateral contracts analysis and noting “[t]he employee’s
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract”).
146. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000).
147. Apps, supra note 55, at 915 (“[T]he reasonable notice requirement cannot be a part and
parcel of the fact that contracts are unilateral.”).
148. See discussion supra Part I.
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promises on a whim in the future. Finally, handbook disclaimers
should be irrelevant in handbook analysis, as they provide little to no
added insight to the intentions of the parties but often permit gross
unfairness on the part of employers toward employees.
On a deeper level, however, this Note additionally proposes that
courts should no longer cling to the safe harbor provided by contract
principles; rather, they should embrace the concept of employment as
status and consequently be willing to find the solution that is most
equitable among the parties and not necessarily the “contractually”
correct result. For so important and fundamental a relationship in the
lives of people as the work relationship, it is of the utmost importance
that courts seek to hold parties to basic notions of fairness. For
handbooks, achieving fairness means delving into the fundamental
nature of how they are used and impact the employment relationship;
for employees and employers alike, handbooks typically mean greater
stability, order, and efficiency in the workplace. But although
employers should not be forever bound to antiquated policies
disseminated through handbooks, employees should not be unjustly
harmed by employers who can revoke any handbook promise on a
whim. The solution for both is one of flexible, reasonable notice and
ultimately greater fairness in employment.

